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Essay: 
How Malleability Matters 	Jason	Rantanen1		In	The	Malleability	of	Patent	Rights,	I	developed	the	concept	that	patent	rights	are	malleable	rather	than	static	and	fixed,	distinguishing	malleability	 from	 the	 idea	 that	 patent	 rights	are	merely	uncertain.	Malleability	refers	to	the	idea	that	the	strength	 and	 scope	 of	 patent	 rights	 can	 be	 altered	 by	 the	actors	 who	 interact	 with	 a	 patent	 well	 after	 it	 has	 issued.	Patent	 law	 is	 full	 of	mechanisms	 that	 allow	 for	 these	 post-issuance	changes,	yet	there	seems	to	be	no	good	theoretical	argument	that	supports	malleability.	At	best,	I	concluded,	the	costs	 of	malleability	must	be	weighed	 against	 the	doctrinal	cures,	and	perhaps	those	cures	themselves	would	come	with	greater	 costs	 of	 their	 own.	 	 This	 Essay	 builds	 upon	 The	Malleability	of	Patent	Rights	 to	explain	how	viewing	patent	rights	 as	 malleable	 can	 dramatically	 alter	 conventional	narratives	 of	 the	 patent	 system—both	 narratives	 told	 by	supporters	 of	 strong	 patent	 rights	 and	 narratives	 told	 by	those	who	argue	that	the	patent	system	must	be	changed	to	favor	competitors.	In	doing	so,	this	Essay	provides	examples	of	how	the	malleable	nature	of	patent	rights	can	present	real	problems	for	the	patent	system.		
																																																								1	 Professor	 of	 Law,	 University	 of	 Iowa	 College	 of	 Law.	 	 I	 thank	Christina	Bohannan,	Steve	Burton,	Tun-Jen	Chiang,	Tom	Cotter,	John	Duffy,	 Richard	 Epstein,	 Paul	 Gowder,	 Herbert	 Hovenkamp,	 Mark	Lemley,	Peter	Menell,	Lisa	Larrimore	Ouellette,	Oskar	Liivak,	Robert	Miller,	 Todd	 Pettys,	 Michael	 Risch,	 Dave	 Schwartz,	 Jacob	 Sherkow,	Greg	Vetter,	and	the	audience	members	and	participants	at	the	Drake	Intellectual	 Property	 Roundtable,	 the	 Patent	 Conference	 4,	 and	 the	Iowa	Legal	Studies	Workshop	for	very	helpful	discussions	about	the	project	and	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.	 	I	also	thank	my	research	assistants	 Alex	 Lodge,	 Rajul	 Patel	 and	 Andrew	 Stanley	 for	 help	 in	preparing	this	Article.		
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Introduction In	The	Malleability	of	Patent	Rights,	I	developed	the	concept	of	malleability:	that	the	strength	and	scope	of	patent	rights	can	be	altered	by	the	actors	who	interact	with	a	patent	well	after	it	has	issued.2	The	rights	granted	by	a	particular	patent	are	not	fixed	in	 the	sense	 that	 they	are	 immutable	and	unalterable.	Rather,	they	can	be	pushed	and	pulled.	Their	very	existence	and	shape	can	be	changed	through	an	array	of	legal	mechanisms.		I	contrasted	this	view	of	patent	rights	with	the	predominant	view,	which	conceives	of	patent	rights	as	fundamentally	static	and	unchanging,	frozen	forever	at	the	moment	the	patent	issues.	Even	 when	 scholars,	 lawyers,	 judges,	 and	 policy	 makers	recognize	that	there	are	uncertainties	inherent	in	patent	rights,	they	tend	to	view	those	uncertainties	as	 just	a	puzzle	to	solve	with,	 ultimately,	 a	 “right”	 answer,	 or	 as	 a	 hopelessly	indeterminate	problem	whose	resolution	is	essentially	a	roll	of	the	dice.	Malleability	 embodies	 a	different	 characteristic:	 that	regardless	 of	 whether	 one	 views	 patent	 rights	 as	 certain	 or	probabilistic,	the	scope	of	the	patent	right	or	the	likelihood	of	a	particular	 roll	 can	 be	 deliberately	 changed	 during	 a	 patent’s	term.3		In	this	Essay,	I	explore	the	consequences	of	viewing	patent	rights	as	malleable.	I	offer	two	scenarios	in	which	recognizing	the	 malleability	 of	 patent	 rights	 can	 alter	 conventional	narratives	 told	 about	 those	 rights.	 In	 the	 first,	 I	 apply	 the	concept	of	malleability	to	the	primary	narrative	articulated	by	supporters	 of	 emerging	 patent	 monetization	 strategies,	 a	narrative	that	draws	upon	two	arguments:	that	such	strategies	are	 economically	 efficient	 because	 (1)	 they	 ensure	 that	inventors	 receive	 their	 just	 rewards	 for	 the	 teachings	 of	 the	patent,	and	(2)	they	reduce	the	costs	of	transacting	over	patent	rights.	 Because	 patent	 rights	 are	 malleable,	 however,	 patent	owners	 can	 actively	 expand	 the	 scope	 and	 strength	 of	 those	rights	 independent	 of	 a	 patent’s	 technological	 teachings.	 In																																																									2	 Jason	Rantanen,	The	Malleability	of	Patent	Rights	2015	MICH.	ST.	L.	REV.	895	(2015).	3	For	a	much	more	extensive	description	of	the	concept	of	malleability,	including	how	it	operates	and	possible	theoretical	 justifications,	see	
id.	
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other	 words,	 patent	 owners	 can	 extract	 revenue	 not	 only	 by	reducing	transaction	costs,	adding	to	the	value	of	the	underlying	technology,	or	(in	the	conventional	challenge	to	the	narrative)	reaping	nuisance	costs,4	but	also	by	expanding	the	patent	right	itself	 after	 it	 has	 issued.	 This	 insight	 leads	 to	 an	 alternative	narrative,	one	that	neither	revolves	around	efficiency	gains	nor	invokes	the	critique	of	nuisance	costs.		But	malleability	can	work	the	other	way,	too:	it	can	be	used	to	push	back	against	the	scope	and	strength	of	a	patent,	even	if	the	teachings	of	the	patent	reflect	an	important	advancement	in	the	art.	Beyond	the	presence	of	at	least	two	parties	in	every	patent	lawsuit,	including	an	accused	infringer	who	can	shove	back	on	patent	scope	and	strength,	is	the	existence	of	mechanisms	that	expressly	allow	patent	challengers	to	push	on	claim	scope	or	to	even	terminate	the	patent	right	after	it	has	issued.	In	particular,	the	 recently-implemented	mechanisms	 of	 inter	 partes	 review	and	covered	business	method	review	affect	the	malleability	of	the	patent	right	 in	a	remarkably	one-sided	way.	Furthermore,	the	consequences	of	these	new	mechanisms	are	not	limited	to	just	 so-called	 “low-quality”	 patents	 but	 can	 affect	 a	 much	broader	range	of	patents.	
I. The Malleability of Patent Rights and the Efficient-
Invention Narrative One	 of	 the	 most	 (if	 not	 the	 most)	 complex,	 prominent,	 and	divisive	issues	in	patent	law	today	is	whether	emerging	patent																																																									4	See,	 e.g.,	Colleen	V.	Chien,	Reforming	Software	Patents,	 50	HOUS.	L.	REV.	325,	342	(2012)	(discussing	“the	incentive	that	exists	to	assert	patents	because	defending	against	patent	demands	is	expensive,	and,	therefore,	induces	settlement”);	Jonathan	S.	Masur,	Costly	Screens	and	
Patent	Examination,	2	J.	LEG.	ANALYSIS	687,	707–11	(2010)	(discussing	the	problems	of	nuisance	patents);	Ted	Sichelman,	Commercializing	
Patents,	62	STAN.	L.	REV.	341,	368	(2010)	(stating	that	nonpracticing	entities	“are	often	termed	‘patent	trolls,’	because	they	tend	to	exploit	litigation	and	licensing	market	defects	to	extract	unwarranted	rents	from	 commercializers,	 usually	 on	 patents	 that	 the	 commercializer	was	completely	unaware	of	before	the	NPE’s	demand	for	payment”);	Ranganath	 Sudarshan,	 Nuisance-Value	 Patent	 Suits:	 An	 Economic	
Model	and	Proposal,	25	SANTA	CLARA	COMPUTER	&	HIGH	TECH.	L.	J.	159,	160–62	(2008).	
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monetization	 strategies—a	 collective	 term	 that	 encompasses	actors	such	as	non-practicing	entities,	patent-assertion	entities,	and	 similar	 business	 models—are	 beneficial	 or	 harmful	 as	 a	matter	of	public	policy.5	The	primary	policy	argument	in	favor	of	these	strategies	rests	on	a	relatively	simple	narrative	that	I	refer	to	as	the	“efficient-invention	narrative.”	In	this	section,	I	 examine	 this	narrative	and	explain	 its	normative	pull—a	pull	that	rests	largely	on	the	view	that	patent	rights	are	fixed.		
A.	The	Efficient-Invention	Narrative	The	“efficient-invention	narrative”	refers	to	the	idea	that	patent-assertion	 entities	 and	 other	 entities	 who	 acquire	 patents	 in	order	 to	monetize	 them	are	 fundamentally	beneficial	 from	an	economic	 perspective	 because	 they	 make	 the	 patent	 system	operate	more	smoothly	and	effectively.		The	narrative	is	woven	through	most	aspects	of	the	public	persona	 of	 every	 entity	 engaged	 in	 emerging	 patent	monetization	strategies	—	that	is,	profit-generating	commercial	strategies	 based	 on	 the	 buying,	 licensing,	 and	 enforcing	 of	patented	 technologies	 without	 any	 meaningful	 attempt	 to	practice	the	technology	of	the	patent.6	Labels	for	such	entities	
																																																								5	See,	e.g.,	Dennis	Crouch,	Professor-to-Professor:	You	Are	Wrong	about	
Patent	 Reform,	 PATENTLY-O	 (Mar.	 10,	 2015),	http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/03/professor-patent-reform.html.	6	For	examples	of	such	strategies,	see	Peter	Detkin,	Leveling	the	Patent	
Playing	Field,	6	J.	MARSHALL	REV.	INTELL.	PROP.	L.	636,	637–40	(2007);	Raymond	 P.	 Niro,	Who	 is	 Really	 Undermining	 the	 Patent	 System—
“Patent	Trolls”	 or	Congress?,	 6	 J.	MARSHALL	REV.	 INTELL.	PROP.	L.	 185,	190–97	(2007);	Patrick	Ennis,	Patents	Are	Recipes,	Not	Monopolies,	on	
Invention,	 INTELL.	 VENTURES	 (Nov.	 18,	 2013),	http://www.intellectualventures.com/insights/archives/patents-recipes-not-monopolies-on-invention;	 Paul	 Schneck,	 Not	 So	 Scary,	
After	All:	In	Defense	of	Patent	Trolls,	FORBES	(Feb.	1,	2013,	8:19	PM),	http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2013/02/01/not-so-scary-after-all-in-defense-of-patent-trolls;	 Adam	 Mossoff	 &	 Nathan	Myhrvold,	The	Future	of	Invention—What’s	at	Risk	(Sept.	12,	2013)	(transcript	 available	 at	http://www.intellectualventures.com/assets_docs/Future_of_Invention_Whats_at_Risk_Transcript_2013_Speech.pdf).	
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are	numerous,	from	“patent-assertion	entity”7	(PAE)	to	“patent	dealer,”8	“patent	intermediary”9	to	“patent	troll.”10	These	labels	are	 almost	 useless	 as	 meaningful	 categories,	 however,	 since	entities	engaged	in	emerging	patent	monetization	strategies	are	even	more	diverse	than	the	strategies	themselves,11	leading	to	a	morass	of	 categorization	attempts	 that	are	doomed	 to	 failure.	On	this,	both	sides	of	the	debate	over	such	entities	agree.12		For	 this	 reason,	 although	 I	 refer	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 PAEs	below,	I	do	so	only	as	a	touchstone:	a	basic	point	around	which	to	orient	rather	 than	a	precisely	defined	category.	Rather,	 the	better	way	 to	 think	of	 these	entities	 is	as	a	 collection	of	 their	attributes	 and	 behaviors.	 For	 now,	 however,	 it	 suffices	 to	reference	 PAEs	 in	 order	 to	 sketch	 out	 the	 dimensions	 of	 the	efficient-invention	 narrative	 upon	 which	 most—if	 not	 all—emerging	patent	monetization	 strategies	 draw	 to	 support	 the	idea	that	they	are	economically	beneficial.13																																																										7	Colleen	V.	Chien,	From	Arms	Race	to	Marketplace:	The	New	Complex	Patent	 Ecosystem	 and	 Its	 Implications	 for	 the	 Patent	 System,	 62	HASTINGS	 L.J.	 297,	 300	 (2010)	 (coining	 the	 term	 “patent-assertion	entity”).		8	 James	McDonough	 III,	Comment,	The	Myth	of	 the	Patent	Troll:	An	Alternative	 View	 of	 the	 Function	 of	 Patent	 Dealers	 in	 an	 Idea	Economy,	56	EMORY	L.J.	189,	212	(2006).	9	Allen	W.	Wang,	Rise	of	the	Patent	Intermediaries,	25	BERKELEY	TECH.	L.J.	159,	160	(2010).	10	 See,	 e.g.,	 Robert	 P.	 Merges,	 The	 Trouble	 with	 Trolls:	 Innovation,	Rent-Seeking,	 and	Patent	 Law	Reform,	 24	BERKELEY	TECH.	L.J.	 1583,	1583	(2009).	11	 See	 Chien,	 supra	 note	 7,	 at	 320	 (describing	 a	 “complex	 patent	ecosystem”).	12	See,	e.g.,	Mark	A.	Lemley	&	A.	Douglas	Melamed,	Missing	the	Forest	
for	the	Trolls,	113	COLUM.	L.	REV.	2117,	2121–29	(2013);	Michael	Risch,	
Patent	Portfolios	as	Securities,	63	DUKE	L.J.	89,	127–28	(2013);	David	L.	 Schwartz	 &	 Jay	 P.	 Kesan,	 Analyzing	 the	 Role	 of	 Non-Practicing	
Entities	in	the	Patent	System,	99	CORNELL	L.	REV.	425,	428–33	(2014).	13	While	this	narrative	may	be	a	powerful	one,	it	is	important	to	keep	in	mind	 its	 limitations.	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	 suggests	 that	 patent	assertions	 involving	 actual	 copying	 of	 technology	may	be	 rare.	See,	
e.g.,	Christopher	A.	Cotropia	&	Mark	A.	Lemley,	Copying	in	Patent	Law,	87	 N.C.	 L.	 REV.	 1421,	 1423–24	 (2009)	 (finding	 that	 outside	 of	pharmaceutical	cases,	virtually	no	patent	lawsuits	involve	a	defendant	who	obtained	the	technology	from	the	plaintiff).	
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A	 hypothetical14	 illustrates	 the	 basic	 premise	 of	 the	narrative:		
After	 decades	 of	 experience	 working	 in	 the	
chemical	 and	 semiconductor	 industries,	 Dr.	 C	
decides	to	devote	himself	full-time	to	inventing	and	
experimenting	in	his	own	laboratory.	After	several	
years,	 Dr.	 C	 develops	 two	 technologies	 for	
enhancing	computer	microprocessors:	one	that	can	
be	used	in	nearly	all	microprocessors	to	boost	their	
speed	 and	 one	 that	 will	 make	 a	 specific	 type	 of	
microprocessor	 much	 more	 efficient.	 He	 obtains	
multiple	 patents	 on	 his	 technologies	 and	 shows	
these	 patents	 to	 several	 microchip	 companies.	
Despite	telling	him	that	they	are	not	interested,	all	
of	 the	 companies	 incorporate	 Dr.	 C’s	 first	
technology	into	their	own	products.	Worse,	Dr.	C	is	
unable	to	find	any	companies	that	could	make	use	
of	his	second	microprocessor	advance.		
Disheartened	and	 lacking	 the	resources	 to	mount	
an	 effective	 lawsuit	 against	 the	 infringers	 (who	
have	 deep	 pockets	 of	 their	 own),	 Dr.	 C	 gives	 up	
inventing	and	spends	his	life	golfing.		This	 hypothetical	 illuminates	 two	 fundamental	 failures.	First,	 it	 illustrates	 the	 breakdown	 of	 the	 fundamental	mechanism	 by	 which	 patent	 law	 operates	 to	 promote	technological	progress	(i.e.,	the	market	reward	for	inventing).15		The	 basic	 mechanism	 by	 which	 patent	 law	 encourages	invention	is	to	give	the	inventor	exclusive	rights	over	the	new	technology	 that	 enable	 that	 inventor	 to	 charge	supracompetitive	 prices	 in	 the	 marketplace.16	 Inventors	 are																																																									14	This	hypothetical	is	based	on	the	story	of	Dr.	James	Cunningham,	as	told	by	Detkin,	supra	note	6,	at	639.	15	See,	 e.g.,	CRAIG	ALLEN	NARD,	THE	LAW	OF	PATENTS	33	 (3d	ed.	2014)	(“The	historically	predominant	theory	[of	patent	law]	is	the	incentive	
to	invent	.	.	.	.”);	WILLIAM	M.	LANDES	&	RICHARD	A.	POSNER,	THE	ECONOMIC	STRUCTURE	OF	INTELLECTUAL	PROPERTY	LAW	294	(2004)	(“The	standard	rationale	of	patent	law	is	that	it	is	an	efficient	method	of	enabling	the	benefits	 of	 research	 and	 development	 to	 be	 internalized,	 thus	promoting	innovation	and	technological	progress.”).	16	See,	e.g.,	Jason	Rantanen,	Peripheral	Disclosure,	74	U.	PITT.	L.	REV.	1,	10	 (2012)	 (“The	 patent	 system	 encourages	 investment	 in	technological	 development	 by	 giving	 the	 investor	 who	 first	
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then	able	 to	monetize	 their	 invention	either	by	practicing	 the	invention	themselves	and	charging	a	supracompetitive	price	or	by	licensing	the	right	to	use	the	technology	to	others.17	In	 the	 above	 hypothetical,	 however,	 Dr.	 C	 was	 unable	 to	monetize	his	invention	using	either	approach.	He	was	not	able	to	 practice	 the	 invention	 himself	 in	 any	 commercially	meaningful	way	because,	as	an	independent	inventor,	he	lacked	the	 necessary	 resources.	 Nor	 was	 he	 able	 to	 license	 the	technology	to	those	who	could	practice	it	on	a	commercial	scale;	the	semiconductor	companies	stole	it	outright.	Note	that	Dr.	C’s	ownership	of	a	patent	did	not	change	the	outcome.	Because	he	lacked	the	ability	to	present	a	meaningful	threat	of	enforcement,	the	companies	simply	trod	on	his	rights.18		When	 inventors	 are	 unable	 to	 capture	 the	 value	 of	 their	inventions,	 they	 have	 fewer	 resources	 to	 invest	 in	 creating	future	 inventions.	 Even	 worse,	 an	 inventor	 may	 simply	conclude,	as	Dr.	C	did,	that	she	is	better	off	not	inventing;	with	a	smaller	expectation	of	monetary	reward	ex	ante,	inventors	have	less	 incentive	 to	begin	 inventing	 in	 the	 first	 place.19	 Potential	investors,	 too,	 will	 be	 less	 willing	 to	 devote	 resources	 to	research	 and	 development	 for	 similar	 reasons:	 they	 will	 be	unable	to	share	in	any	of	the	value	of	the	invention.20		The	above	hypothetical	also	illustrates	a	second	failure,	one	due	to	 transaction	costs.	Recall	 that	Dr.	C	developed	a	second	technology	 that	 was	 fairly	 specific	 but	 was	 unable	 to	 find	 a	company	that	used	the	specific	semiconductor	design	required																																																									successfully	 develops	 a	 new	 product	 or	 method	 the	 possibility	 of	obtaining	exclusive	rights	over	that	invention,	allowing	the	inventor	to	charge	a	supra-competitive	price	during	the	patent’s	life.”).		17	Id.	at	16	n.63.	18	As	framed,	this	story	draws	upon	the	idea	of	patents	as	a	solution	to	Arrow’s	Paradox.		One	alternate	criticism	of	the	narrative,	then,	is	that	as	 Michael	 Burstein	 points	 out,	 the	 multi-faceted	 nature	 of	information	may	mean	that	there	is	an	array	of	solutions	to	Arrow’s	Paradox	 that	 do	 not	 require	 intellectual	 property	 protections.	 	 See	Michael	 J.	 Burstein,	 Exchanging	 Information	 Without	 Intellectual	
Property,	91	TEX.	L.	 	REV.	227,	258–70	(2012),	 In	other	words,	Dr.	C	could	have	monetized	his	 invention	 through	alternate	mechanisms,	and	the	dichotomy	of	patent-or-nothing	is	false.	19	LANDES	&	POSNER,	supra	note	15,	at	13.	20	LANDES	&	POSNER,	supra	note	15,	at	13;	Risch,	supra	note	12,	at	128.		
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to	take	advantage	of	it.	This	is	an	example	of	a	transaction	failure	due	 to	 transaction	 costs	 that	 are	 simply	 too	high.21	 Inventors	need	 to	 find	 potential	 users	 of	 their	 technologies;	 potential	users	need	 to	 find	 inventors.22	This	 can	be	quite	 difficult	 and	costly.	Furthermore,	even	if	a	transaction	does	occur,	it	will	likely	involve	substantial	costs.	For	example,	the	parties	will	need	to	deal	 with	 Arrow’s	 Information	 Paradox	 (the	 problem	 that	inventors	 must	 disclose	 information	 about	 the	 invention	 in	order	to	attract	investors,	which	in	turn	destroys	the	secrecy	of	the	information,	and	hence	its	value).23		Although	that	problem	may	be	addressed	through	mechanisms	other	than	patents24	it	will	 nonetheless	 impose	 at	 least	 some	 costs	 on	 information	exchange.25		But	what	happens	when	a	third	party	gets	 involved	on	Dr.	C’s	behalf?	What	if,	rather	than	holding	on	to	his	patents,	Dr.	C	sold	them	to	a	company	that	was	in	the	business	of	buying	and	enforcing	patents?26	Consider	the	following	modification	of	the	hypothetical:																																																									21	LANDES	&	POSNER,	supra	note	15,	at	16–17;	see	also	Harold	Demsetz,	
Toward	a	Theory	of	Property	Rights,	 57	AM.	ECON.	REV.	347,	348–49	(1967)	(discussing	transaction	costs	in	general).	22	McDonough,	supra	note	8,	at	213–14.	23	 See	 Kenneth	 J.	 Arrow,	 Economic	 Welfare	 and	 the	 Allocation	 of	
Resources	 for	 Invention,	 in	 THE	 RATE	 AND	 DIRECTION	 OF	 INVENTIVE	ACTIVITY,	609	(Nat’l	Bureau	of	Econ.	Research	ed.	1962).	24	Mark	A.	Lemley,	The	Surprising	Virtues	of	Treating	Trade	Secrets	as	
IP	 Rights,	 61	 STAN.	 L.	 REV.	 311,	 336–37	 (2008)	 (arguing	 that	 trade	secret	law	partially	solves	Arrow’s	Paradox);	Burstein,	supra	note	18,	at	 262–70	 (describing	 non-intellectual	 property	 mechanisms	 for	addressing	the	information	exchange	paradox).	25	 Such	 costs	 include	 paying	 attorneys	 to	 draft	 confidentiality	agreements.	 Michael	 Burstein	 provides	 an	 extensive	 analysis	 of	various	 ways	 in	 which	 Arrow’s	 Paradox	 can	 be	 overcome	 and	discusses	their	limitations	and	costs.		See	Burstein,	supra	note	18,	at	227.	Burstein	suggests,	however,	that	information	is	far	more	complex	than	conventionally	assumptions	allow	for	and	the	degree	to	which	it	is	 appropriable	 in	 the	 context	 of	 an	 information	 exchange.	 	 For	purposes	 of	 this	 Article,	 however,	 the	 important	 point	 remains:	exchanging	information	is	costly—perhaps	more	so	than	the	existing	literature	has	recognized.	26	That	is	what	happened	in	the	real	story.	Detkin,	supra	note	6,	at	644	(“Dr.	 Cunningham,	 for	 example,	 sold	 his	 suite	 of	 semiconductor	
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While	golfing	one	day,	Dr.	C	meets	 the	CEO	of	an	
entity	 called	 Innovation	 Unpacked	 Corp.	 (“IUC”).	
IUC	is	a	company	that	acts	as	“the	bridge	between	
invention	and	application”27	to	generate	“a	strong	
return	 on	 investment,”	 purchasing	 “inventions	
from	 individual	 inventors	 and	 companies	 of	 all	
sizes”	 and	 licensing	 “them	 to	 the	 world’s	 most	
innovative	companies.”28	Dr.	C	agrees	to	assign	his	
patents	 to	 IUC	 for	a	 substantial	 sum	plus	a	 small	
share	 of	 any	 licensing	 revenue	 that	 IUC	 obtains	
from	the	patents.	
Following	this	initial	transaction,	IUC	contacts	the	
semiconductor	 companies	 that	Dr.	 C	 had	 initially	
approached.	 Recognizing	 IUC’s	 substantial	
experience	in	the	patent	assertion-field,	most	of	the	
semiconductor	 entities	 quickly	 agree	 to	 a	
nonexclusive	 license	 to	 the	 patents.	 IUC	 then	
proceeds	 to	bring	an	 infringement	action	against	
the	holdout,	in	which	it	prevails,	in	part	due	to	its	
substantial	 expertise	 in	 patent	 infringement	
lawsuits	 and	 highly	 skilled	 attorneys.	 IUC	 is	 also	
able	to	use	its	knowledge	of	the	industry	to	identify	
a	company	that	could	make	use	of	Dr.	C’s	second,	
more	 specific	 technological	 advance	 and	 licenses	
that	patent	as	well.	In	 this	 scenario,	 IUC	 fulfills	 two	 positive	 economic	functions.29	 First,	 it	 forces	 transactions	 to	 occur	 that	 would																																																									patents	to	Intellectual	Ventures	in	exchange	for	a	lump	sum	payment	in	 a	 transaction	 that	 took	 far	 less	 time	 than	 a	 typical	 licensing	negotiation.”).	27	ACACIA	RESEARCH	CORP.,	http://acaciaresearch.com/	28	 Sell	 Your	 Patents,	 INTELLECTUAL	 VENTURES,	http://www.intellectualventures.com/services-solutions/sell	29	Fiona	Scott	Morton	and	Carl	Shapiro	offer	another	articulation	of	this	narrative:		An	inventor	has	discovered	and	patented	valuable	technology,	but	she	lacks	 the	 assets	 to	 exploit	 it	 herself	 and	 is	 having	 difficulty	 finding	downstream	firms	that	can	do	so.	She	also	is	having	difficulty	locating	downstream	firms	that	have	copied	her	technology	and	are	not	paying	royalties.	 She	 sells	 her	 patent	 to	 a	 PAE	 that	 is	 skilled	 at	 finding	downstream	 firms	 to	which	 the	 technology	can	be	 transferred.	The	PAE	also	is	good	at	locating	unscrupulous	firms	that	have	copied	the	patented	technology	and	are	using	it	without	paying,	by	hiding	and	by	
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otherwise	 constitute	 theft	 of	 the	 patented	 technology:	 a	 one-sided	exchange	under	which	the	inventor	receives	nothing	and	the	user	of	the	technology	gets	all.30	In	other	words,	PAEs	solve	the	free-riding	problem	by	making	sure	that	there	is	a	credible	enforcement	 threat.31	 They	 can	 centralize	 the	 gathering	 of	information	 and	 closely	monitor	 users.32	 PAEs	may	 also	 have	particular	expertise	in	patent	enforcement,33	allowing	them	to	send	out	more	 letters	and,	perhaps,	 litigate	more	efficiently.34	PAEs	may	also	have	more	resources	to	bring	a	credible	threat	of	litigation	and	extract	a	fair	license	than	an	individual	inventor.35																																																									ignoring	 demand	 letters.	 The	 PAE	 also	 is	 skillful	 at	 negotiating	reasonable	royalties,	 in	part	due	 to	 its	 litigation	capabilities.	 In	 this	narrative,	the	PAE	improves	the	functioning	of	the	market	for	ideas,	enhances	returns	to	inventors,	and	promotes	innovation.	Fiona	M.	Scott	Morton	&	Carl	Shapiro,	Strategic	Patent	Acquisitions,	79	ANTITRUST	L.J.	463,	479	(2014)	30	 See	PRESIDENT'S	 COUNCIL	 OF	ECON.	ADVISERS,	 PATENT	ASSERTION	 AND	U.S.	 INNOVATION	 3	 (2013)	 (“[P]otential	 inventors	 may	 not	 have	 the	resources	to	protect	their	patents	from	infringement;	their	incentives	to	invent	may	be	increased	if	they	can	sell	their	patents	to	firms	that	specialize	 in	 litigation	 and	other	means	 to	 collect	 license	 fees	 from	those	 who	 are	 using	 the	 patented	 technology.”)	 [hereinafter	PRESIDENT’S	COUNCIL].	31	See	generally	McDonough,	supra	note	8,	at	206–12	(explaining	“[a]t	a	minimum,	there	must	be	a	credible	threat	of	litigation	to	incentivize	potential	infringers	to	license	the	patent”).	32	See	PRESIDENT’S	COUNCIL,	supra	note	30,	at	3;	McDonough,	supra	note	8,	at	212.	33	 See	 http://www.cnet.com/news/inside-intellectual-ventures-the-most-hated-company-in-tech/		34	See	President’s	Council,	supra	note	30,	at	3;	U.S.	Gov’t	Accountability	Office,	 GAO-13-465,	 Intellectual	 Property:	 Assessing	 Factors	 That	Affect	 Patent	 Infringement	 Litigation	 Could	 Help	 Improve	 Patent	Quality	3	n.8	(2013)	(noting	that	because	PAEs	do	not	make	products,	they	have	lower	discovery	costs,	which	can	cost	several	million	dollars	in	complex	litigation);	Lemley	&	Melamed,	supra	note	12,	at	2147–52,	2162.	35	See	PRESIDENT’S	COUNCIL,	supra	note	30,	at	3	(“[P]otential	inventors	may	 not	 have	 the	 resources	 to	 protect	 their	 patents	 from	infringement;	their	incentives	to	invent	may	be	increased	if	they	can	sell	their	patents	to	firms	that	specialize	in	litigation	and	other	means	to	 collect	 license	 fees	 from	 those	 who	 are	 using	 the	 patented	technology.”);	 Brief	 for	 United	 Inventors	 Assoc.	 &	 Tech.	 Licensing	Corp.	 as	 Amici	 Curiae	 Supporting	 Respondents	 at	 5,	 eBay	 v.	
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Additionally,	 PAEs	 consolidate	 all	 of	 these	 resources	 into	 a	single	 unit	 that,	 according	 to	 their	 marketing	 message,	 can	secure	more	value	than	many	other	types	of	patent	holders.36	Second,	 PAEs	 may	 know	 exactly	 whom	 to	 contact	 and	negotiate	with	because	of	their	concentration	of	knowledge	and	expertise.37	 For	 many	 of	 the	 same	 reasons	 discussed	 above,	PAEs	can	reduce	the	costs	of	patent	rights	transactions:	they	can	act	 as	 centralized	 clearinghouses	 for	 rights,	 where	 both	production	 entities	 and	 inventors	 can	 go	 to	 transact,	 thus	greatly	reducing	the	information	cost	of	transacting.38		Thus,	under	this	efficient-invention	narrative,	PAEs	should	be	 at	 least	 tolerated—and	 certainly	 not	 punished—because	they	reduce	transaction	costs	and	ensure	that	inventors	receive	
																																																								MercExchange,	 L.L.C.,	 547	 U.S.	 388	 (2006)	 (No.	 05-130)	 (“Often	times…inventors	 are	 forced	 to	 litigate	 against	 would-be	 licensees,	who	have	the	economic	clout	and	resources	to	drain	inventors	and	tie	them	up	in	costly	litigation.”);	McDonough,	supra	note	8,	at	209;	Sannu	K.	 Shrestha,	 Note,	Trolls	 or	Market-Makers?An	 Empirical	 Analysis	 of	
Nonpracticing	Entities,	110	COLUM.	L.	REV.	114,	126–27	(2010).	36	See	PRESIDENT’S	COUNCIL,	supra	note	30,	at	3	(“[I]t	can	be	costly	for	technology	 users	 to	 find	 all	 potentially-relevant	 patents.	 Effective	brokering	 of	 patents	 by	 intermediaries	 can	 therefore	 increase	 the	value	 of	 patents,	 fostering	 greater	 incentives	 to	 innovate.”);	McDonough,	supra	8,	at	212;	see	also	Brett	M.	Frischmann	&	Mark	A.	Lemley,	 Spillovers,	 107	 COLUM.	L.	REV.	 257,	 267	 (2007)	 (noting	 that	under	 a	 Coasean	 perspective,	 “[p]roperty	 rights	 can	 be	 a	 useful	institution	for	reducing	transaction	costs	where	such	rights	delegate	decisionmaking	authority	to	the	entity	with	the	closest	connection	to	and	best	information	regarding	the	resource”).	37	See	PRESIDENT’S	COUNCIL,	supra	note	30,	at	3	(“Patent	intermediaries	can	play	a	useful	social	role.	Inventors	and	buyers	of	patents	(such	as	a	 manufacturer	 who	 can	 commercialize	 patented	 inventions)	 may	have	 a	 difficult	 time	 finding	 each	 other	 because	 the	 potential	usefulness	of	 a	patented	 technology	 is	often	not	obvious,	 and	often	depends	on	the	complementarity	between	the	protected	technology	and	the	buyer’s	own	portfolio	of	technology.”).	38	 PRESIDENT’S	 COUNCIL,	 supra	 note	 30,	 at	 3	 (“[PAEs]	 bring	 value	 to	society	by	more	efficiently	matching	patent	holders	to	patent	buyers,	thereby	fostering	transfer	of	technology	from	inventors	to	those	who	can	 use	 the	 technology	 to	 make	 products	 that	 are	 valuable	 to	consumers.”);	Lemley	&	Melamed,	supra	note	12,	at	2155–62.	
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the	rewards	for	invention	to	which	they	are	entitled	by	virtue	of	the	patent	grant.39		
B.	The	Narrative	Inverted	How	does	the	reconceptualization	of	patent	rights	as	malleable	interact	with	the	efficient-invention	narrative?	As	laid	out	in	the	previous	 section,	 the	 efficient-invention	narrative	 is	 based	on	the	dual	arguments	that	(1)	PAEs	ensure	that	inventors	receive	their	due	 rewards	and	 (2)	PAEs	enhance	 the	efficiency	of	 the	patent	transaction	by	reducing	transaction	costs.		Yet,	the	narrative	begins	to	break	down	when	the	malleable	nature	 of	 patent	 rights	 is	 considered.	 Both	 the	 scope	 and	strength	 of	 patent	 rights	 can	 be	 altered	 after	 issuance,	independent	 of	 the	 underlying	 technological	 disclosure.40	 In	other	words,	because	patent	 law	doctrine	operates	only	as	an	elastic	leash	over	the	scope	of	the	patent	rights	relative	to	the	underlying	technology	disclosed	in	the	patent,41	it	is	possible	to	expand	 the	scope	of	 the	patent	 rights	without	doing	anything	with	 the	 technological	 teachings	of	 the	patent.	Viewed	 in	 this	light,	patents	are	less	embodiments	of	technology	and	more	like	rights	 alone.	 The	 consequence	 is	 that	 only	 a	 portion	 of	 the	enforced	scope	of	patent	rights	may	reflect	the	inventor’s	actual	contribution.	 Instead,	 some	 of	 the	 value	 that	 a	 patent	middleman	 extracts	 can	 be	 due	 to	 its	 own	 expansion	 of	 the																																																									39	Some	commentators	also	offer	a	third	benefit:	clearing	the	market	and	improving	patent	liquidity.		See,	e.g.,	McDonough,	supra	note	8,	at	214–16;	 Yuichi	 Watanabe,	 Comment,	 Patent	 Licensing	 and	 the	
Emergence	of	a	New	Patent	Market,	9	HOUS.	BUS.	&	TAX.	L.J.	445,	460–62	(2009).		This	is	essentially	a	combination	of	reducing	transaction	costs	and	ensuring	 that	 inventors	receive	 their	due	rewards,	 rather	than	a	true	separate	benefit.		In	other	words,	patents	are	perceived	as	more	liquid	precisely	because	the	costs	for	transacting	around	them	are	reduced	and	patents	actually	have	value	in	the	hands	of	inventors,	rather	than	being	merely	worthless	pieces	of	paper.			40	As	I	discuss	in	The	Malleablity	of	Patent	Rights,	this	independence	is	not	perfect;	rather	patent	law	doctrine	does	impose	some	constraints	on	the	degree	to	which	patent	scope	can	depart	from	the	technological	disclosure	of	the	document.		See	Rantanen,	supra	note	1.		Thus,	patent	law	doctrine	operates	more	like	an	elastic	leash	than	a	rigid	chain	on	patent	scope.				41	For	a	discussion	of	how	patent	law	doctrine	operates	in	this	way,	
see	Rantanen,	supra	note	1.	
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rights	and	not	due	to	 the	value	of	 the	teachings	of	 the	patent.	Due	to	the	malleable	nature	of	patent	rights,	a	patent	claim	in	the	right	hands	can	have	greater	scope	than	a	patent	claim	in	someone	else’s	hands.		When	patent	rights	are	viewed	as	malleable,	the	tale	takes	an	 unexpected	 twist:	 the	 efficient	 use	 of	 patent	 rights	 (the	hallmark	of	a	good	PAE)	may,	instead,	be	simply	the	expansion	of	rights	ex	post.	This	expansion	is	very	different	than	additional	social	 gains	 in	 the	 form	 of	 more	 efficient	 transactions	 or	 in	merely	making	others	aware	of	the	value	of	the	new	technology.	Instead,	what	 is	 occurring	may	 be	 an	 expansion	 of	 the	 rights	alone,	capturing	more	and	more	territory	with	the	same	patent.	Moreover,	this	expansion	can	occur	without	any	increase	in	the	value	of	the	teachings	of	the	patent.42	To	use	a	property	analogy,	it	is	as	if	A	purchased	a	plot	of	land	with	area	X	and	was	able	to	increase	 its	 area	 to	 X+Y	 simply	 because	 it	 chose	 to	 do	 so;	 no	increase	 in	 the	 value	 of	 the	 property	 is	 necessary	 for	 the	expansion	to	occur.	In	other	words,	the	better	a	PAE	is	at	enforcing	a	patent,	the	more	likely	the	PAE	is	capturing	value	from	sources	other	than	the	inventor’s	actual	technological	contribution	because	it	is	its	skill	 at	 enforcement	 that	 a	 PAE	 uses	 to	 broaden	 the	 effective	scope	of	patent	rights.	Also,	more	transactions	are	not	simply	a	benign	 result	 of	 greater	 efficiency	 and	 reduced	 transaction	costs.	Rather,	the	alternative	is	that	increases	in	the	number	of																																																									42	There	may	be	other	changes	 to	 the	strength	of	patent	 rights	 that	flow	from	changes	in	ownership.		Consider,	for	example,	what	would	happen	 if	 Dr.	 C	 brought	 an	 infringement	 suit	 against	 an	 infringing	semiconductor	company.		That	company	would	likely	seek	discovery	of	Dr.	C.		It	might	be	particularly	interested	in	evidence	of	prior	sales	or	 potential	 material	 for	 an	 inequitable	 conduct	 claim.	 	 It	 might	request	 the	 inventor’s	 own	 prosecution	 files.	 	 Responding	 to	 this	discovery	will	be	costly	for	Dr.	C;	worse,	it	could	turn	up	information	that	would	be	useful	in	invalidity	or	unenforceability	arguments.	 	If,	however,	Dr.	C	sells	the	patent	to	IUC,	and	IUC	is	the	entity	that	files	the	 infringement	 complaint,	 the	 discovery	 burdens	 on	 the	 patent	holder	will	be	less.		IUC	will	presumably	not	have	the	same	volume	of	records	that	Dr.	C	has;	indeed,	it	may	have	relatively	little	discoverable	material.		It	will	also	probably	not	have	any	evidence	of	prior	sales	or	potential	material	for	an	inequitable	conduct	claim.		The	result	is	that	IUC’s	patent	rights	will	effectively	be	greater	because	it	will	not	have	the	same	baggage	that	Dr.	C	had.		
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transactions	may	be	due	to	an	expanded	patent	scope	capturing	more	firms	and	people	within	its	net.	This	 critique	 thus	 differs	 in	 two	 important	ways	 from	 the	conventional	 challenge	 to	 the	 efficient-invention	 narrative,	which	rests	on	the	idea	that	PAEs	are	using	patents	to	extract	nuisance	costs	(i.e.,	some	settlement	that	is	less	than	the	cost	of	a	litigating	a	patent	suit).43	First,	this	critique	does	not	assume	that	the	patents	being	asserted	are	necessarily	weak	ones:	the	focus	 is	 on	 making	 the	 patent	 right	 greater	 rather	 than	 on	attempting	to	capitalize	on	the	accused	infringer’s	defense	costs.	Second,	malleability	involves	an	actual	change	of	the	legal	right	itself;	a	pushing	on	the	boundary	of	that	scope.	But	wait;	 surely	 the	 accused	 infringers	 could	do	 the	 exact	same	 thing	 but	 in	 reverse:	 shrink	 the	 effective	 scope	 of	 the	patent	 through	 effective	 argument	 and	 clever	 strategy?	Absolutely—skilled	patent	challengers	may	push	back	against	the	 scope	 and	 strength	 of	 patent	 rights.	 	 Patent	 infringement	suits	do	not	involve	unidirectional	malleability,	but	instead	can	be	viewed	as	a	battle	between	two	sides,	with	each	pushing	and	pulling	 on	 the	 aspects	 of	 the	 patent	 that	 offer	 the	 greatest	potential	for	victory.			My	point	here,	however,	is	simply	the	idea	that	entities	who	specialize	 in	 patent	 transactions	 are	 inherently	 economically	efficient	rests	on	an	assumption	that	patent	rights	are	fixed.	If,	instead,	patent	rights	are	malleable,	that	assumption	no	longer	holds.44	 	 Instead,	 it	 is	 the	skill	of	 the	 litigator,	 rather	 than	 the	contents	of	the	patent	right,	that	matter.		Furthermore,	if	there	are	systematic	advantages	possessed	by	some	entities—such	as	PAEs—due	 to	 the	 very	 nature	 of	 those	 entities,	 those	advantages	 can	 manifest	 as	 stronger,	 greater	 patent	 rights.	These	types	of	unidirectional	abilities	that	take	advantage	of	the	
																																																								43	See,	e.g.,	Chien,	supra	note	4,	at	342	(discussing	“the	incentive	that	exists	to	assert	patents	because	defending	against	patent	demands	is	expensive,	and,	therefore,	induces	settlement”).			44	 Note	 that	 there	 may	 still	 be	 efficiencies	 gained	 from	 patent	transactions;	 particularly	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 consolidation	 of	 rights	relating	to	a	particular	technology.		See	Mark	A.	Lemley	&	Carl	Shapiro,	
Patent	Holdup	 and	 Royalty	 Stacking,	 85	 TEX.	 L.	REV.	 1991,	 2005–08	(2007).		I	do	not	address	that	perspective	here.			
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malleability	of	patent	rights	are	areas	that	merit	especially	close	scrutiny.	
II. Malleability and Patent Reforms  Setting	 aside	 concerns	 about	 systematic	 imbalances	 between	litigants,	 patent	 infringement	 litigation	 typically	 offers	 both	parties	the	opportunity	to	take	advantage	of	the	malleability	of	patent	 rights	 to	 more	 or	 less	 the	 same	 degree.	 	 This	 bi-directional	malleability	can	be	contrasted	with	situations	where	the	malleability	 is	much	more	 unidirectional—in	 other	words,	situations	 where	 one	 party	 is	 able	 to	 take	 much	 greater	advantage	of	the	malleability	of	patent	rights	than	the	other.			A	 powerful	 example	 of	 unidirectional	 malleability	 can	 be	found	in	recently	implemented	mechanisms	for	“patent	reform”	(i.e.,	attempts	to	improve	the	functioning	of	the	patent	system	through	legislative	changes).	A	central	element	of	these	reform	efforts	has	been	the	development	of	new	processes	to	weed	out	low-quality	patents—patents	that	should	not	have	been	granted	but	 nonetheless	were.45	 These	mechanisms	 consist	 of	 several	new	 and	 revised	 procedural	 routes	 for	 challenging	 issued	patents.46	Members	of	Congress	intended	these	mechanisms	to	allow	interested	parties	to	challenge	patents	that	fail	to	meet	the	requirements	of	patentability	or	 that	 claim	 too	broadly,47	and																																																									45	See,	 e.g.,	 Gerard	N.	Magliocca,	Blackberries	 and	Barnyards:	 Patent	
Trolls	and	the	Perils	of	Innovation,	82	NOTRE	DAME	L.	REV.	1809,	1827	(2007)	 (indicating	 that	 “low	 quality	 patents”	 are	 those	 that	 are	erroneously	 granted	 and	 of	 questionable	 validity);	R.	 Polk	Wagner,	
Understanding	 Patent-Quality	 Mechanisms,	 157	 U.	 PA.	 L.	 REV.	 2135,	2138	(2009)	(defining	a	low	quality	patent).		The	very	concept	of	low	quality	 patents	 draws	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 patent	 rights	 are	 fixed,	 not	malleable:	a	patent	is	low	quality	because	it	never	should	have	issued	but	for	a	mistake	made	by	someone.	To	be	clear,	I	am	not	contending	here	that	there	is	no	such	thing	a	low	quality	patent;	malleability	does	not	mean	that	a	stone	statue	of	a	horse	can	be	changed	into	a	bronze	statue	 of	 a	 cat.	 	 I	 am	 simply	 pointing	 out	 that	 the	 language	 of	discussions	about	low	quality	patents	inevitably	draws	upon	the	idea	of	fixed	rights.		46	See	DONALD	S.	CHISUM,	CHISUM	ON	PATENTS	§	11.07	(2014)	(discussing	post-issuance	review	mechanisms).	47	157	CONG.	REC.	E1184	(daily	ed.	June	23,	2011)	(statement	of	Rep.	Lamar	 Smith)	 (“This	 bill	 will	 provide	 the	 patent	 office	 with	 a	 fast,	
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commentators	hailed	their	creation.48	The	rising	popularity	of	these	 tools	 speaks	 volumes	 about	 their	 perceived	 potency	 in	altering	the	patent	right.	
A.	Inter	Partes	Review	and	Covered	Business	Method	Review	A	core	component	of	the	America	Invents	Act	was	the	creation	of	the	inter	partes	review	mechanism.	This	proceeding	replaced	inter	 partes	 reexamination,	 a	 procedural	 mechanism	implemented	 by	 the	 American	 Inventors	 Protection	 Act	 of	199949	that	allowed	for	an	adversarial-style	challenge	to	issued	patents	 at	 the	 United	 States	 Patent	 and	 Trademark	 Office	(PTO).50	Inter	partes	reexamination	was,	from	the	perspective	of	some,	an	unsuccessful	experiment.51	While	the	outcomes	of	inter	partes	reexamination	proceedings	favored	petitioners	as	
																																																								precise	vehicle	to	review	low	quality	business	method	patents,	which	the	Supreme	Court	has	acknowledged	are	often	abstract	and	overly	broad.”).	See	generally	Joe	Matal,	A	Guide	to	the	Legislative	History	of	
the	America	 Invents	 Act:	 Part	 II	 of	 II,	 21	 FED.	CIR.	B.J.	 539,	 598–612	(2012)	(describing	the	legislative	history	of	the	America	Invents	Act’s	revisions	to	inter	partes	review	and	post-grant	review).				48	See,	e.g.,	Jay	Kesan,	America	Invents,	More	or	Less?,	160	U.	PA.	L.	REV.	PENNUMBRA	 229,	 234–35,	 249	 (2012)	 (“There	 are	 good	 reasons	 to	conclude	that	post-grant	review	and	inter	partes	review	will	improve	patent	quality.”);	Brian	J.	Love	&	Shawn	Ambwani,	Inter	Partes	Review:	
An	 Early	 Look	 at	 the	 Numbers,	 81	 U.	 CHI.	 L.	 REV.	 DIALOGUE	 93,	 105	(2014)	 (evaluating	 inter	 partes	 review	 outcomes	 and	 concluding	“Congress	appears	 to	have	hit	 the	mark—but	only	 time	will	 tell	 for	sure”).		49	See	American	Inventor’s	Protection	Act	of	1999,	Pub.	L.	No.	106-113,	§	4602–07,	113	Stat.	1501A-567–71	(1999).	50	For	a	critique	of	inter	partes	reexamination	at	the	time	of	its	initial	implementation,	see	Mark.	D.	Janis,	Inter	Partes	Patent	Reexamination,	10	FORDHAM	INTELL.	PROP.	MEDIA	&	ENT.	L.J.	481	(1999).		51	 See	 Love	 &	 Ambwani,	 supra	 note	 48,	 at	 95	 (“Though	 originally	developed	 to	 serve	 as	 a	 cost-effective	 alternative	 to	 full-blown	litigation,	reexaminations	rarely	realized	that	goal.”).		But	see	Tun-Jen	Chiang,	 The	 Advantages	 of	 Inter	 Partes	 Reexamination,	 90	 J.	 PAT.	 &	TRADEMARK	OFF.	SOC’Y	579,	585	(2008)	(arguing	that	“Contrary	to	the	conventional	wisdom,	inter	partes	reexamination	has	important	and	often	 overlooked	 advantages	 compared	 to	 the	 other	 avenues	 of	contesting	validity.”).	
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often	as	not,52	a	consensus	had	emerged	at	 the	time	Congress	voted	 for	 the	 America	 Invents	 Act	 that	 inter	 partes	reexamination	was	largely	ineffective	in	achieving	its	purpose:	to	 provide	 a	 low-cost	 mechanism	 for	 challenging	 invalid	patents.53		In	large	part,	this	was	because	the	process	was	slow54	and	 allowed	 patent	 holders	 to	 easily	 amend	 their	 claims	 and	thus	strengthen	their	patents.55	These	attributes	compounded	into	a	severe	image	problem	for	inter	partes	reexamination.	In	short,	a	makeover	was	in	order.		The	new	inter	partes	review	moves	further	away	from	the	traditional	examination	model,	where	the	focus	is	on	a	dialogue	between	the	applicant	and	the	examiner,	and	toward	a	mini-trial	
																																																								52	 U.S.	 PAT.	 &	 TRADEMARK	 OFFICE,	 INTER	 PARTE	 REEXAMINATION	 FILING	DATA,	 SEPTEMBER	 30,	 2013,	http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter_parte_historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.pdf	 (reporting	 that	 out	 of	 the	 305	 inter	 partes	reexamination	certificates	issued	between	1999	and	September	2011,	44%	 had	 resulted	 in	 all	 claims	 being	 cancelled)	 [hereinafter	 INTER	
PARTE	REEXAMINATION	FILING	DATA].		53	Love	&	Ambwani,	supra	note	48,	at	95.		That	said,	it	should	be	noted	that	 towards	 the	 end	of	 the	period,	 inter	 partes	 reexamination	was	seeing	greater	and	greater	use.		See	INTER	PARTE	REEXAMINATION	FILING	DATA,	supra	note	52	(reporting	an	increase	from	1	filing	in	2001	to	374	filings	in	2011).		It	should	also	be	kept	in	mind	that	the	effective	date	provision	 of	 the	 statute	 implementing	 inter	 partes	 reexamination	limited	its	use	to	applications	that	were	filed	on	or	after	November	29,	1999.	See	 American	 Inventor’s	Protection	Act	 of	1999,	Pub.	 L.	 106-113,	 §4608,	 113	 Stat.	 1501A-572	 (1999).	 	 Because	 there	 were	relatively	 few	 patents	 meeting	 this	 requirement	 during	 the	 early	years	of	 IPR,	 it	 should	not	be	 surprising	 that	 there	 few	 inter	partes	reexaminations	during	that	period	either.		54	 The	 process	 typically	 took	 about	 three	 years.	 	 See	 INTER	 PARTE	REEXAMINATION	 FILING	 DATA,	 supra	 note	 52	 (reporting	 an	 average	pendency	of	36.2	months	and	a	median	of	32.9	months).	55	Love	&	Ambwani,	supra	note	48,	at	95	(“[R]eexamination	developed	a	 well-deserved	 reputation	 for	 lengthy	 delays,	 a	 lack	 of	 decisive	results,	and	a	permissiveness	for	claim	amendments	that	led	some	in	the	patent	bar	to	view	reexamination	more	as	a	vehicle	for	patentees	to	strengthen	their	patent	rights	post	hoc	than	as	a	tool	for	possible	infringers	 to	 quickly	 and	 cheaply	 eliminate	 invalid	 claims	 without	resorting	to	litigation.”).	
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before	 a	 panel	 of	 patent	 office	 judges.56	 This	 mini-trial	 is	streamlined	to	be	completed	within	a	year	from	the	time	review	is	instituted.57	Negative	incentives	encourage	parties	who	have	been	 sued	 for	 patent	 infringement	 in	 district	 court	 to	 file	 for	review	quickly.58	Procedural	mechanisms	require	the	petitioner	to	submit	proposed	claim	constructions,	which	may	necessitate	a	 responsive	 claim	 construction	 by	 the	 patent	 owner.	 59	 The	ability	of	 the	patent	holder	 to	offer	 iterative	amendments	has	also	been	sharply	limited.60		The	 result	 of	 the	 new	 inter	 partes	 review	mechanism	has	been	an	explosion	of	filings.61	Some	of	this	may	be	a	“relaunch”	
																																																								56	 See	 Andrei	 Iancu	 Ben	 Haber	 &	 Elizabeth	 Iglesias,	 Inter	 Partes	Review	 is	 the	 New	 Normal:	 What	 Has	 Been	 Lost?	 What	 Has	 Been	Gained?,	40	AIPLA	Q.J.	539,	541–42	(2012).	57	 See	 35	 U.S.C.	 §	 316(a)(11)	 (2012)	 (requiring	 the	 Director	 to	prescribe	specific	regulations	for	the	conduct	of	 inter	partes	review,	including	 “that	 the	 final	 determination	 in	 an	 inter	 partes	 review	be	issued	 not	 later	 than	 1	 year	 after	 the	 date	 on	 which	 the	 Director	notices	the	institution	of	a	review	under	this	chapter”).	 	 In	practice,	this	has	turned	out	to	be	about	15	months,	due	to	an	automatic	six-month	stay	at	 the	discretion	of	 the	patent	office.	 	Love	&	Ambwani,	
supra	note	48,	at	99.	58	See	35	U.S.C.	§	315(b).	59	Iancu,	Haber	&	Iglesias,	supra	note	56,	at	580	(concluding	that	being	required	to	provide	an	express	claim	construction	disadvantages	the	petitioner	more	than	the	patent	owner).	60	 Section	 316	 states	 that	 the	 Director	 of	 the	 Patent	 Office	 shall	prescribe	 regulations,	 inter	 alia,	 “setting	 forth	 standards	 and	procedures	 for	 allowing	 the	 patent	 owner	 to	 move	 to	 amend	 the	patent	under	subsection	(d)	to	cancel	a	challenged	claim	or	propose	a	reasonable	number	of	substitute	claims	.	.	.	.”	35	U.S.C.	§	316(a)(9).	The	final	rule	issued	by	the	Director	limits	patent	owners	to	one	motion	to	amend	as	of	right	and	one	additional	motion	to	amend	with	a	showing	of	good	cause.		See	37	C.F.R.	§	42.221;	Iancu,	Haber	&	Iglesias,	supra	note	56,	at	568–70	(discussing	the	change	from	the	amendment-and-response	format	to	one	that	leads	quickly	to	a	final	disposition).		As	of	spring	2016,	however,	 this	practice	may	be	changing.	See	Director’s	Forum:	A	Blog	from	USPTO’s	Leadership,	PTAB	Issues	Final	Rules	for	
Improved	 Proceedings,	 USPTO.GOV,	 (Mar.	 31,	 2016,	 2:36	 PM),	http://www.uspto.gov/blog.	61	 See	 Love	 &	 Ambwani,	 supra	 note	 48,	 at	 96–97	 (reporting	 that	between	September	16,	2012	and	March	31,	2014,	challengers	filed	a	total	of	979	petitions,	“roughly	half	the	total	number	of	requests	for	
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effect:	the	mere	perception	that	inter	partes	review	is	a	useful	tool	 for	 patent	 challengers,	 along	 with	 both	 the	 flurry	 of	publicity	accompanying	the	signing	of	the	America	Invents	Act	and	 commentary	on	all	 its	 changes,	might	be	driving	 some	of	these	filings.	However,	there	is	also	a	sense	that	these	changes	are	real	and	meaningful	and	that	inter	partes	review	is	a	much	more	 effective	 procedural	 mechanism	 for	 patent	 challengers	than	inter	partes	reexamination	ever	could	have	been.62		A	logical	reading	of	this	result	is	that	it	is	a	positive.	After	all,	a	driving	motivation	for	implementing	inter	partes	review	was	to	establish	a	viable	proceeding	at	the	PTO	to	hear	challenges	involving	“questionable”	or	“low-quality”	patents.63	Inter	partes																																																									
inter	partes	reexamination	filed	over	the	course	of	the	thirteen	years	prior”).	62	 See,	 e.g.,	 Steven	 J.	 Baughman,	 Special	 Report:	 Advantages	 of	 the	
Defensive	 Use	 of	 US	 Patent	 Reexaminations	 for	 Companies	 Based	
Abroad,	BUREAU	NA’L	AFF.	32,	33–36	(2011)	(outlining	the	“significant	potential	 benefits”	 using	 inter	 partes	 reexamination);	 Douglas	Duff,	
The	 Reexamination	 Power	 of	 Patent	 Infringers	 and	 the	 Forgotten	
Inventor,	 41	 CAP.	 U.	 L.	 REV.	 693,	 698–705	 (2013)	 (discussing	 the	popularity	 of	 inter	 partes	 review	 and	 providing	 reasons	 for	 its	popularity);	Love	&	Ambwani,	supra	note	48,	at	99	(commenting	that	
inter	partes	review	“is	considerably	more	powerful	than	inter	partes	reexamination”).	63	 See	 FEDERAL	 TRADE	 COMMISSION,	 A	 Report	 by	 the	 Federal	 Trade	
Commission	 October	 2003,	 TO	 PROMOTE	 INNOVATION:	 THE	 PROPER	BALANCE	 OF	 COMPETITION	 AND	 PATENT	 LAW	 AND	 POLICY	 at	 8	 (2003),	http://	 www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.	 (“Because	existing	means	 for	challenging	questionable	patents	are	 inadequate,	we	 recommend	 an	 administrative	 procedure	 for	 post-grant	 review	and	 opposition	 that	 allows	 for	 meaningful	 challenges	 to	 patent	validity	short	of	federal	court	litigation.”)	(emphasis	added);	Comm.	on	Intellectual	Prop.	Rights	in	the	Knowledge-Based	Econ.,	Bd.	On	Sci.,	Tech.,	and	Econ.	Policy,	Nat'l	Research	Council	of	the	Nat'l	Acads.,	A	Patent	System	for	the	21st	Century,	at	95	(Stephen	A.	Merrill,	Richard	C.	Levin	&	Mark	B.	Myers	eds.,	2004)	(recommending	adoption	of	an	“Open	Review”	system	to	address	low-quality	patents);	see	also	Kesan,	
supra	 note	 48,	 at	 248–51	 (arguing	 that	 inter	 partes	 review	 will	improve	overall	patent	quality)	(emphasis	added).		This	goal	of	only	allowing	inter	partes	review	for	questionable	patents	can	also	be	seen	in	the	threshold	requirement	for	 initiation	of	an	IPR:	that	there	 is	a	“reasonable	likelihood	that	the	petitioner	would	prevail	with	respect	to	at	least	1	of	the	claims	challenged	in	the	petition.”		35	U.S.C.	§	314.		In	 practice,	 however,	 inter	 partes	 review	 is	 routinely	 initiated.	 	See	Love	&	Ambwani,	supra	note	48,	at	101	(reporting	that	out	of	the	823	
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review	 furthers	 this	 purpose:	 it	 weeds	 out	 the	 “low-quality	patents”	 via	 administrative	 challenges	 rather	 than	 costly	infringement	proceedings.		A	 second	 post-issuance	 mechanism	 introduced	 by	 the	America	 Invents	 Act,	 the	 covered	 business	 method	 (CBM)	review,64	represents	an	even	more	deliberate	attempt	to	allow	patent	 challengers	 to	 eliminate	 and	 weaken	 certain	 types	 of	patents	after	they	are	issued.		The	 history	 of	 business	 method	 patents	 is	 well	documented,65	and	there	is	no	need	to	repeat	it	in	depth	here.	It	is	enough	 to	simply	recognize	 that	some	 innovation	 takes	 the	form	 of	 computer-implemented	 financial	 tasks	 and	 other	business	methods.	Consider,	for	example,	Amazon’s	infamous	1-click	 patent.66	 A	 fundamental	 issue	 underlying	 this	 type	 of	patent	 is	 whether	 it	 claims	 ideas	 that	 are	 too	 abstract	 to	 be	patentable.	For	a	while,	the	answer	was	generally	no;	business	methods	could	be	patented.	In	the	Federal	Circuit’s	1998	decision	in	State	Street	 Bank,67	 the	 court	 held	 that	 business	methods	 could	 be	patentable,	 as	 long	 as	 they	 produce	 a	 “useful,	 concrete	 and	
																																																								petition	 with	 an	 institution	 decision,	 84%	 had	 at	 least	 1	 claim	instituted	and	74%	had	all	challenged	claims	instituted).				64	Leahy-Smith	America	Invents	Act,	Pub.	L.	No.	112-29,	§	18,	125	Stat.	284,	 329–31	 (2011).	 In	 addition	 to	 inter	 partes	 review	 and	 CBM	Review,	the	AIA	also	introduced	a	post-grant	review	mechanism	that	is	available	for	nine	months	after	a	patent	issues.		See	§§	321–29,	125	Stat.	at	306–13.	Generally	speaking,	the	same	points	discussed	in	this	Part	 could	 apply	 to	 post-grant	 review.	 	 That	 said,	 since	 post-grant	review	is	limited	to	only	a	short	window	after	a	patent	issues,	it	could	thus	be	viewed	more	as	part	of	 the	process	of	ensuring	that	a	valid	right	 is	 issued	 in	 the	 first	place	 (similar	 to	 trademark	registration’s	opposition	period)	than	invoking	malleability.		65	See,	e.g.,	Megan	M.	La	Belle	&	Heidi	Mandanis	Schooner,	Big	Banks	
and	Business	Method	Patents,	16	U.	PA.	J.	BUS.	L.	431	(2014);	Mark	A.	Lemley,	Michael	Risch,	Ted	Sichelman,	&	R.	Polk	Wagner,	Life	After	
Bilski,	63	STAN.	L.	REV.	1315	(2011);	Joshua	D.	Sarnoff,	Patent-Eligible	
Inventions	After	Bilski:	History	and	Theory,	63	HASTINGS	L.J.	53	(2011).	66	U.S.	Patent	No.	5,960,411	(filed	Sept.	28,	1999).	67	State	St.	Bank	&	Trust	Co.	v.	Signature	Fin.	Grp.,	149	F.3d	1368	(Fed.	Cir.	1998).	
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tangible	result,”	in	this	case,	“share	prices.”68	The	result	was	that	business	methods	were,	generally,	patentable	subject	matter.	However,	in	2010,	the	Supreme	Court	issued	its	decision	in	Bilski	v.	Kappos	which	offers	patent	challengers	a	new	tool	for	contesting	 business	 method	 patents:	 the	 requirement	 of	patentable	 subject	 matter.69	 The	 Supreme	 Court’s	 Bilski	decision	 did	 not	 simply	 breathe	 new	 life	 into	 the	 relatively	dormant	 doctrine;70	 it	 was	 a	 Frankensteinian	 surge.71	 The	reaction	 to	 Bilski	was	 both	 swift	 and	 great:	 Section	 101	 rose	from	 the	 ashes	 to	 become	 a	 significant	 (perhaps	 the	 most	significant,	in	the	case	of	software-based	patents),	limitation	on	patents,	 one	 that	 has	 spawned	 more	 recent	 Supreme	 Court	decisions—all	 enhancing	 the	 scrutiny	 patents	 face	 under	 this	requirement—than	any	other	issue	in	patent	law.72	Corresponding	with	the	rise	of	Section	101	as	a	meaningful	limitation	on	patents,	Congress,	as	part	of	the	America	Invents	Act,	 implemented	 a	 special	 procedural	 mechanism	 to	 allow	parties	to	challenge	business	method	patents	at	the	PTO	after	
																																																								68	 Id.	at	 1373	 (quoting	 In	 re	 Alappat,	 33	 F.3d	1526,	 1543	 (Fed.	 Cir.	1994),	abrogated	by	In	re	Bilski,	545	F.3d	943	(Fed.	Cir.	2008));	 see	
also	 La	 Belle	 &	 Schooner,	 supra	 note	 65,	 at	 445;	 Lemley,	 Risch,	Schelman	&	Wagner,	supra	note	65,	at	1318.	69	35	U.S.C.	§	101.		The	outcome	of	Bilski	was	not	a	complete	surprise;	the	Federal	Circuit’s	2008	decision	had,	after	all,	affirmed	the	patent	office’s	rejection	of	Bilski’s	claims,	Bilski,	545	F.3d	at	949.		70	See	CRAIG	ALLEN	NARD	&	R.	POLK	WAGNER,	PATENT	LAW	122–23	(1st	ed.	 2008)	 (“The	 tale	 of	 the	 modern	 application	 of	 §	 101	 is	 one	 of	uncertainty,	 debate,	 and	 (especially)	 gradually	 receding	importance.”);	Lemley,	Risch,	Schelman	&	Wagner,	supra	note	65,	at	1318	 (“For	 a	 decade	 after	 1998,	 patentable	 subject	 matter	 was	effectively	a	dead	letter.”).	71	 And	 indeed,	 Frankenstein	 is	 a	 perfect	 metaphor	 for	 post-Bilski	Section	101	jurisprudence.		72	Alice	Corp.	Pty.	v.	CLS	Bank	Int’l,	134	S.	Ct.	2347	(2014)	(holding	method	for	mitigating	settlement	risk	as	not	patent	eligible	under	§	101);	Ass’n	for	Molecular	Pathology	v.	Myriad	Genetics,	Inc.,	133	S.	Ct.	2107	(2013)	(holding	isolated	DNA	is	not	patent	eligible	under	§	101);	Mayo	Collaborative	Servs.	v.	Prometheus	Labs.,	 Inc.,	132	S.	Ct.	1289	(2012)	 (holding	 a	 method	 for	 administering	 drug,	 measuring	metabolite	levels,	and	issuing	warnings	is	not	patent	eligible	under	§	101).		
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issuance.	From	at	least	one	Senator’s	perspective,	the	purpose	of	this	procedure	was	clear:	Recent	court	decisions	.	 .	 .	have	sharply	pulled	back	on	the	patenting	 of	 business	 methods,	 emphasizing	 that	 these	“inventions”	are	too	abstract	to	be	patentable.	In	the	intervening	years,	 however,	 PTO	 was	 forced	 to	 issue	 a	 large	 number	 of	business-method	patents,	many	or	possibly	all	of	which	are	no	longer	valid.	The	Schumer	proceeding	offers	a	relatively	cheap	alternative	to	civil	 litigation	for	challenging	these	patents,	and	will	 reduce	 the	 burden	 on	 the	 courts	 of	 dealing	 with	 the	backwash	of	invalid	business	method	patents.73	The	CBM	review	mechanism	allows	parties	to	challenge	the	validity	 of	 business	 method	 patents	 that,	 under	 then-current	law,	 were	 presumed	 valid	 when	 issued	 but,	 under	 the	intervening	court	decisions,	are	no	longer	valid.	As	with	the	inter	partes	review	proceeding,	the	results	of	the	CBM	review	can	be	seen	as	desirable.		Patents	that	never	should	have	 issued	 are	 being	 weeded	 out,	 and	 no	 longer	 operate	 to	grant	their	owners	exclusive	rights.			
B.	Unidirectional	Malleability	Consider,	 however,	 how	 looking	 at	 patent	 rights	 as	malleable	impacts	this	view.	If	indeed	the	scope	and	strength	of	a	patent	depend	substantially	on	the	actions	of	those	who	interact	with	the	 patent	 after	 its	 issuance,	 perhaps	 more	 so	 than	 on	 the	inherent	 characteristics	 of	 the	 patent	 itself,	 then	 inter	 partes	review	 is	 not	 merely	 a	 tool	 to	 be	 brought	 to	 bear	 on	 “low-quality”	 patents.	 It	 is	 a	 tool	 that	 rational	 parties	 and	 skilled	lawyers	will	bring	to	bear	whenever	threatened	with	a	patent.74	Unsurprisingly,	 the	 patents	 being	 challenged	 through	 inter	partes	review	are	also	overwhelmingly	involved	in	infringement	
																																																								73	157	CONG.	REC.	S1367	(daily	ed.	Mar.	8,	2011)	(statement	of	Sen.	Jon	Kyl).	74	 See	 Jacob	 Sherkow,	Administrating	 Patent	 Litigation,	 90	WASH.	 L.	REV.	 205,	 260	 (observing	 that	 “[t]hese	 loose	 restrictions	 on	 the	availability	 of	 alternative	 for	 a	 to	 patent	 litigation	 make	 the	procedures	ripe	for	abuse”).	
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suits.75	 And	 there	 are	 many	 inter	 partes	 reviews	 being	instituted;	 the	 PTO	 reported	 1,737	 petitions	 filed	 in	 financial	year	 2015	 resulting	 in	 801	 inter	 partes	 proceedings	 being	instituted.76	 	 CBM	 review	 is	 less	 common,	 with	 only	 149	petitions	filed	in	financial	year	2015,	77but	it	is	still	seeing	use.	Just	as	with	infringement	trials,	malleability	can	manifest	in	these	post-issuance	proceedings	at	the	PTO.	As	in	infringement	proceedings,	malleability	allows	the	challenger	to	push	and	pull	on	 the	 scope	 and	 strength	 of	 the	 patent.	 The	 challenger	 can	choose	to	initiate	an	inter	partes	review;	the	challenger	selects	the	prior	art	to	assert	in	the	inter	partes	review;	the	challenger	chooses	which	 claims	 to	 target;	 the	 challenger	offers	 the	 first	claim	construction.78			To	these	are	added	all	the	standard	forms	in	which	malleability	 exists:	 the	 elastic	 nature	 of	 claim	 scope	relative	 to	 what	 is	 disclosed,	 for	 example.79	 Since	 the	 patent	rights	are	malleable,	this	allows	the	challenger	to	push	them	in	the	 direction	 that	 favors	 the	 outcome	 desired	 by	 the	 patent	challenger.			But	 unlike	 in	 infringement	 actions,	 that	 malleability	 is	unidirectional	in	that	it	largely	only	operates	to	the	detriment	of	the	patent	owner.80		If	the	patent	challenger	wins,	the	claims	are	declared	 unpatentable	 and	 hence	 no	 longer	 an	 exclusionary																																																									75	See	Love	&	Ambwani,	supra	note	48,	at	103	(reporting	that	“in	80	percent	of	IPRs,	the	challenged	patent	was	also	asserted	in	litigation	between	the	petitioner	and	respondent.).	76	 Patent	 Trial	 and	 Appeal	 Board	 AIA	 Progress:	 Statistics	 (as	 of	
2/29/2016),	 U.S.	 PAT.	 &	 TRADEMARK	 OFF.,	http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016-2-29%20PTAB.pdf.	(last	visited	Apr.	2,	2016).		77	Id.	78	Adding	 to	 this	point,	 the	patent	 challenger	 in	 inter	partes	 review	need	not	be	a	defendant	in	an	infringement	suit	brought	by	the	patent	holder,	 or	 even	 a	 competitor.	 	 Anyone	 can	 initiate	 an	 inter	 partes	review.		See	Sherkow,	supra	note	74,	at	231	(“Any	person	“other	than	the	patent	owner”	may	bring	petitions	for	inter	partes	and	post-grant	reviews.”).	79	Rantanen,	supra	note	2,	at	28–30.	
	80	 C.f.	 Chiang,	 supra	 note	 51,	 at	 581	 (explaining	 that	 inter	 partes	reexamination	 offered	 advantages	 for	 the	 petitioner	 and	 relatively	little	downside).			
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right.		On	the	other	hand,	if	the	patent	owner	wins,	the	result	is	essentially	the	status	quo:	it	keeps	the	claims	that	it	already	had.		In	 contrast,	 if	 the	 patent	 owner	 prevails	 in	 an	 infringement	proceeding,	it	obtains	a	judgment	of	infringement,	entitling	it	to	remedies	such	as	damages	and	an	injunction.81		The	result	is	that	the	challenger	can	push	on	the	scope	of	the	patent	to	maximize	the	likelihood	of	its	invalidity	while	not	bearing	the	countering	risk	 of	maximizing	 its	 chances	 of	 an	 infringement	 finding.	 	 In	short,	it	turns	Giles	Rich’s	aphorism	that	“the	stronger	a	patent	the	weaker	it	is	and	the	weaker	a	patent	the	stronger	it	is”	on	its	head.82	To	be	fair,	there	are	some	benefits	that	accrue	to	the	patent	owner.		The	patent	owner	gains	the	benefit	of	estoppel	against	that	particular	challenger	with	respect	to	“any	ground	that	the	petitioner	 raised	or	 reasonably	 could	have	 raised	during	 that	inter	 partes	 review.”83	 	 Although	 the	 exact	 scope	 of	 the	“reasonably	could	have	raised”	 language	remains	unsettled,	 it	unquestionably	 excludes	 invalidity	 arguments	 such	 as	indefiniteness,	 lack	 of	 patentable	 subject	matter,	 or	 failure	 to	comply	with	the	disclosure	requirements	of	§	112(a),	as	these	arguments	cannot	be	raised	in	an	inter	partes	review	petition.84		Thus,	if	the	patent	challenger	loses	on	the	inter	partes	review,	it	can	 still	 defend	 itself	 on	 infringement	 and	 other	 invalidity	grounds	at	the	district	court.		In	addition,	the	patent	challenger	will	not	be	bound	by	the	claim	construction	it	proffered	during	inter	partes	review	when	it	comes	time	to	argue	noninfringement	at	the	district	court.85	The	 PTO	 analyzes	 the	 validity	 of	 claims	 under	 a	 “broadest	
																																																								81	See	35	U.S.C.	§	283,	284.			82	Giles	S.	Rich,	The	Proposed	Patent	Legislation:	Some	Comments,		35	GEO	WASH.	L.	REV.	641,	644	(1967).	83	35	U.S.C.	§	315(e)(2).	84	See	35	U.S.C.	§	311(b)	(“A	petitioner	in	an	inter	partes	review	may	request	to	cancel	as	unpatentable	1	or	more	claims	of	a	patent	only	on	a	ground	that	could	be	raised	under	section	102	or	103	and	only	on	the	basis	of	prior	art	consisting	of	patents	or	printed	publications.”).	85		See	Director’s	Forum:	A	Blog	from	USPTO’s	Leadership,	supra	note	60.	
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reasonable	 interpretation”	 standard	 of	 claim	 construction.86	The	 purpose	 of	 this	 standard	 is	 to	 ensure	 that	 all	 possible	invalidity	arguments	are	considered	at	the	PTO.87	Proceedings	at	the	district	court,	however,	simply	construe	the	claim	term,	which	 results	 in	 a	 potentially	 narrower	 claim	 scope.88	 This	combination	 allows	 the	 patent	 challenger	 to	 argue	 invalidity	during	inter	partes	review	using	the	broader	claim	scope	(thus	increasing	the	likelihood	of	invalidity)	and	noninfringement	at	the	 district	 court	 proceeding	 using	 the	 narrower	 claim	 scope	(thus	increasing	the	likelihood	of	no	infringement).89	CBM	 review	 represents	 an	 even	 stronger	 case	 of	 a	procedural	mechanism	that	allows	malleability	to	operate	in	a	way	that	is	only	to	the	disadvantage	of	patent	owners.		As	with	inter	partes	review,	CBM	review	is	largely	one-sided	in	its	effect.	A	 successful	 petitioner	 in	 CBM	 review	 can	 eliminate	 or																																																									86	 See	 Dawn-Marie	 Bey	 &	 Christopher	 A.	 Cotropia,	 The	
Unreasonableness	 of	 the	 Patent	 Office’s	 “Broadest	 Reasonable	
Interpretation”	Standard	37	AM.	INTELL.	PROP.	L.	ASS’N	Q.	J.	285	(2009)	(describing	 the	broadest	 reasonable	 interpretation	 standard).	 	 This	standard	applies	to	inter	partes	review.		See	37	C.F.R.	§	42.3001(b)	(“A	claim	 in	an	unexpired	patent	shall	be	given	 its	broadest	reasonable	construction	 in	 light	 of	 the	 specification	 of	 the	 patent	 in	 which	 it	appears.”);	Office	 Patent	Trial	 Practice	Guide,	 77	 	 Fed.	 Reg.	 48,756,	48,764	 (Aug.	 14,	 2012)	 (“The	 Office	 has	 for	 decades	 employed	 the	broadest	 reasonable	 interpretation	 standard	 to	 construe	 claims	before	the	Office,	and	it	will	continue	to	do	so	in	IPR,	PGR,	and	CBM	proceedings	for	construing	challenged	claims	as	well	as	any	amended	or	 new	 claims.”);	 Gregory	 Dolin	 &	 Irina	 D.	 Manta,	 Taking	 Patents,	WASH.	&	LEE	L.	REV.	(forthcoming	2016).		87	See	Bey	&	Cotropia,	supra	note	86,	at	291	(“The	standard	allegedly	helps	 the	 USPTO	 avoid	 erroneously	 blessing	 a	 claim	 as	 patentable	when	a	district	court	may	construe	the	same	claim	more	broadly	than	the	 USPTO	 had	 considered,	 with	 the	 resulting	 increase	 in	 scope	capturing	prior	art	or	an	obvious	variation	of	the	prior	art.”).	88	See	 id.	at	287–88	(describing	the	district	court	approach	to	claim	construction).	89	 C.f.	 id.	 at	 303–06	 (pointing	 out	 the	 potential	 difference	 between	claim	scope	under	USPTO	methodology	and	claim	scope	under	district	court	 methodology.);	 Mike's	 Train	 House,	 Inc.	 v.	 Broadway	 Ltd.	Imports,	LLC,	No.	1:09–CV–02657–JKB,	2012	WL	664498,	at	*22	(D.	Md.	Feb.	27,	2012),	aff'd,	500	F.	App'x	958	(Fed.	Cir.	2013)	(rejecting	patent	 holder’s	 argument	 that	 estoppel	 applied	 based	 on	 accused	infringer’s	 allegedly	 different	 claim	 constructions	 in	 ex	 parte	reexamination	and	infringement	proceeding).		
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substantially	 reduce	 the	 scope	 of	 an	 issued	 patent.90	 A	successful	patent	holder,	on	the	other	hand,	merely	maintains	the	status	quo:	it	keeps	the	same	rights	that	it	previously	held.	While,	 as	 with	 inter	 partes	 review,	 there	 are	 some	 potential	benefits	 that	 a	 patent	 owner	 can	 reap—estoppel	 as	 to	 that	particular	 patent	 challenger,	 a	 non-binding	 but	 potentially	persuasive	decision	by	the	PTO	that	the	patent	is	valid	as	against	the	particular	legal	challenge,	and	an	opportunity	to	strengthen	the	claims	through	amendment91—but	they	are	more	like	door	prizes	that	reduce	the	downside	of	CBM	review	and	offer	little	upside.	Still,	the	patent	holder	does	have	some	choices	to	make	and	some	ability	to	use	the	malleability	of	patent	rights	in	its	favor.	As	discussed	above,	patent	holders	can	(theoretically,	at	least)	amend	their	claims	during	inter	partes	review	and	potentially	emerge	with	claims	that	are	stronger	from	a	validity	standpoint	but	that	still	encompass	the	challenger’s	products	or	methods.92	Patent	holders	can	also	argue	issues	of	claim	construction	and	respond	 to	 invalidity	 arguments,	 thus	 pushing	 to	 expand	 the	scope	 and	 strength	 of	 the	 patent.93	 	 And	 if	 the	 patent	 owner	succeeds,	it	may	obtain	at	least	a	gloss	of	strength	for	the	patent.																																																									90	See	generally	P.	Andrew	Riley,	Jonathan	R.K.	Stroud	&	Jeffrey	Totten	The	Surprising	Breadth	of	Post-Grant	Review	for	Covered-Business-Method	Patents:	A	New	Way	to	Challenge	Patent	Claims,	15	COLUM.	SCI.	&	TECH.	L.	REV.	235	(2014)	(describing	the	CBM	review,	 its	benefits,	and	legislative	history).	91	See	Leahy-Smith	America	Invents	Act,	Pub.	L.	No.	112-29,	§	18,	125	Stat.	284,	329–31	(2011).		92	But	see	Love	&	Ambwani,	supra	note	48,	at	101–02	(reporting	that	“[t]o	date,	the	PTAB	has	granted	just	a	single	motion	to	amend—one	that	 was	 both	 unopposed	 and	 filed	 by	 the	 United	 States	 itself”).		Recently,	the	PTO	amended	its	rules	to	allow	longer	motions	to	amend	claims,	 see	Rules	 for	Practice	 for	Trials	Before	 the	Patent	Trial	 and	Appeal	 Board,	 80	 Fed.	 Reg.	 28561,	 28565	 (May	 19,	 2015)	 (to	 be	codified	 at	 37	 C.F.R.	 pt.	 42)	 (increasing	 page	 limit	 for	 motions	 to	amend	from	15	pages	to	25	pages),	and	it	is	considering	other	changes	to	the	claim	amendment	process.		See	Michelle	K.	Lee,	PTAB’S	Quick-
Fixes	 for	 AIA	 Rules	 Are	 to	 Be	 Implemented	 Immediately,	 DIRECTOR’S	FORUM:	A	BLOG	FROM	USPTO’S	LEADERSHIP	(Mar.	27,	2015,	10:18	AM)	www.uspto.gov/blog/director/entry/ptab_s_quick_fixes_for.		93	 Note	 that	 simply	 because	 the	 PTO	 uses	 a	 “broadest	 reasonable	construction”	 standard	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 claim	 scope	encompasses	everything	under	the	sun.		Claim	construction	can	still	
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So	should	we	be	 troubled	by	 the	unidirectional	manner	 in	which	malleability	operates	in	inter	partes	and	CBM	review?		I	think	 so.	 Unlike	 in	 the	 infringement	 suit	 context,	where	 both	patent	 owners	 and	 accused	 infringers	 have	 at	 least	 the	opportunity	 to	 benefit	 from	 malleability	 inherent	 in	 patent	rights,	these	post-grant	procedures	put	a	thumb	on	the	side	of	the	patent	challenger.		This	concern	is	exacerbated	by	the	use	of	the	broadest	reasonable	interpretation	standard,	which	places	a	thumb	on	the	side	of	the	patent	challenger.		Indeed,	although	there	 are	 a	 variety	 of	 arguments	 as	 to	 why	 the	 broadest	reasonable	 interpretation	 standard	 should	 not	 be	 applied	 in	inter	partes	and	CBM	review,94	it	is	the	interaction	between	that	standard	and	the	malleability	of	patent	rights	that	may	be	the	strongest	policy	argument	against	its	application.	
Conclusion The	Malleability	of	Patent	Rights	introduced	the	idea	that	patent	rights	should	not	be	viewed	as	static	rights,	 fixed	 forever	at	a	precise	moment	in	time.	Rather,	 it	suggested	that	those	rights	should	properly	be	viewed	as	malleable,	that	is,	changeable	(to	at	least	some	degree)	even	after	issuance.	And	it	argued	that	this	change	 need	 not	 accompany	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 value	 of	 the	underlying	 technology	 but	 rather	 could	 take	 the	 form	 of	 an	expansion	in	scope	of	the	rights	themselves.	This	view	of	patent	rights,	as	malleable	rights,	is	not	merely	a	 theoretical	 construct;	 it	 affects	 fundamental	 perceptions	 of	how	 aspects	 of	 the	 patent	 system	 are	 valued.	 Because	 patent	rights	 are	 malleable,	 the	 conventional	 efficient-inventor	narrative	isn’t	quite	as	convincing	as	it	seems,	even	when	taken	at	face	value.		The	malleable	nature	of	patent	rights	also	offers	a	different	perspective	on	patent	reform	efforts.	This	perspective	requires																																																									be	necessary	to	arrive	at	that	reasonable	scope,	and	it	is	not	clear	that	there	is	a	meaningful	difference	between	the	two	standards	in	every	instance.		94	Such	as	Greg	Dolin	&	Irina	Manta’s	Fifth	Amendment	takings-clause	argument,	 see	Dolin,	 supra	note	 86;	but	 see	Camilla	 A.	 Hrdy	&	 Ben	Picozzi,	The	AIA	Is	Not	a	Taking:	A	Response	to	Dolin	&	Manta,	72	WASH.	&	LEE	L.	REV.	ONLINE	472	(2016)	(responding	to	Dolin	&	Manta).	
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a	 greater	 appreciation	 of	 the	 impact	 inter	 partes	 review	 and	covered	 business	 method	 review	 have:	 to	 allow	 patent	challengers	 greater	 ability	 to	 shrink—if	 not	 eliminate—the	scope	of	 issued	patent	 rights	without	allowing	patent	owners	much	of	an	opportunity	to	use	malleability	in	their	favor.			
